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Abstract
We extend Freixas and Rochet (1997) to two-stage game: In the ﬁrst stage each
bank simultaneously decides on amounts of deposits. Then each bank decides on
loan amounts in the second stage. Each stage is a Cournot game in quantity. Scope
economies between loans and deposits also arise explicitly in our model. We show
that in the case where large economies of scope an increase in the interbank interest
rate leads to an decrease in the interest rate on deposits and to an increase in the
interest rate on loans.
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Freixas and Rochet (1997), proceded by the seminal works on monopolistic bank model
by Klein (1971) and Monti (1972), investigates the eﬀects of a monetary policy on bank
behavior in a Cournot oligopoly. Assuming that each bank determines the volumes of
deposits and loans simultaneously in order to maximize their proﬁts (i.e., simultaneous
potfolio choice), and that scope economies (cost complementarities) between loans and
deposits does not exist1, Freixas and Rochet (1997) shows that an increase in the interbank
interest rate leads to an increase in the interest rates on deposits and loans2. However, it
is often pointed out that each bank determines their volumes of loans given the volumes
of deposits, and some empirical studies show that the scope economies between deposits
and loans exists3. Nevertheless, There are few theoretical studies in consideration of these
points.
The purpose of this paper is to construct a model in which each bank determines its
volumes of deposits and loans sequentially (i.e., sequential potfolio choice), and investgates
the eﬀects of a monetary policy on the volumes of deposits, loans and corresponding
interest rates in an oligopoly. For this purpose, we extend Freixas and Rochet (1997) in
the following two directions. First, the deposit and loan decisions are made sequentially,
rather than simultaneously. In the ﬁrst stage each bank simultaneously decides on amounts
of deposits. Then, once that information is revealed, each bank simultaneously decides on
loan amounts in the second stage. This sequential potfolio choice formulation of deposits
and loans competition seems appropriate when the choice of deposits are less ﬂexible and
less frequentry changed than that of loans. The second extension is that scope economies
1This also implicitly assume that the bank’s decision problem is seperable. That is, if there is no
scope economies (i.e., the cost function is seperable), the optimal volumes of loans (and the corresponding
interest rate) is independent of the properties of the deposit market, and the optimal volumes of deposits
(and the corresponding interest rate) is independent of the properties of the loan market. As a result,
there is no link between credit and deposit activities.
2Assuming constant elasticities of demand of loans and supply of deposits, Freixas and Rochet (1997)
also shows that loans rate (resp. deposits rate) becomes less (resp. more) sensitive to changes in the
interbank rate as the intensity of competition increases.
3See Gilligan et al. (1984), Hirota and Tsutsui (1992) among others.
1arises explicitly in our model. Especially, we focus on the role economies of scope play
in producing a counter-intuitive relationship between the interbank interest rate and the
endogenous interest rates.
Our model suggests that the result of Freixas and Rochet (1997) may not continue to
hold when we introduce sequential portfolio choice and scope economies. In particular,
we can identify the situations where an increase in the interbank interest rate leads to an
decrease in the interest rate on deposits and to an increase in the interest rate on loans.
Most closely related to this paper is the above mentioned literature on the industrial
organization approach to banking4. Besides them, Toolsema and Schoonbeek (1999) in-
troduces asymmetries in the cost functions of banks5, or in their way of conduct (Cournot
or Stackelberg) and demonstrates that for the Cournot version with asymmetric costs as
well as for the Stackelberg version of the model, the same results as Freixas and Rochet
(1997) hold for the total volumes of loans and deposits and the corresponding interest
rates, and that, on the other hand, in the asymmetric cost Cournot version the results of
Freixas and Rochet (1997) do not necessarily hold for the individual volumes of loans and
deposits of the the bank with the smallest costs. Compared with the work by Toolsema
and Schoonbeek, our analysis lays particular emphasis on the strategic aspects of deposits
on loans which depend on scope economies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
characterizes the equilibrium outcomes. In section 3 we investigate the eﬀects of changing
the interbank interest rate on the equilibrium quantities and correponding interest rates.
Section 4 concludes. In Appendix we also investigate the eﬀects of a change in the reserve
rate on the equilibium quantities and interest rates.
4This paper is also related to a standard strategic commitment games literature. For example, Brander
and Spencer (1983), Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) consider the case where in the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms take
some action (e.g. R&D, advertising) which alter the conditions of future competition, then competition is
performed based on the action made in the previous stage. ( For a survey, see Tirole (1988).)
5As in the Freixas and Rochet (1997), Toolsema and Schoonbeek (1999) also considers the case in which
cost complementarities (scope economies) between loans and deposits does not exist.
22 The Model
There are two banks, bank A and bank B.6 They operate on the market for loans as well
as on the market for deposits. The diﬀerence between the volume of loans Li and the
volume of deposits Di of the bank i can be borrowed (or lent, if negative) on an interbank
market. Denote the interest rates on the loan market and deposit market by rL and rD,
respectively. The inverse demand function for loans is given by rL(L), L := Li + Lj, with
derivative r
0
L(L) < 0, and the inverse supply fuction of deposits is rD(D), D := Di + Dj,
with derivative r
0
D(D) > 0. The cost of managing an amount L of loans and an amount D
of deposits is given by C(Di,Li). Let r denote the exogenous interest rate on the interbank
market, and α (0 ≤ α < 1) be the exogenous fraction of deposits that is required as a
non-interest bearing reserve by the government or the central bank.
The proﬁt function of bank i is given by
πi(Li,Di) = rL(L)Li + rMi − rD(D)Di − C(Di,Li), i = A,B (1)
where Mi, the net posititon of the bank i on the interbank market, is given by
Mi = (1 − α)Di − Li, i = A,B. (2)
In this paper we specify a nonlinear cost function, which allows for scope economies between
deposits and loans, as follows.
C(Li,Di) = θ(Di)Li + φDi, i = A,B (3)
where φ > 0 is the constant unit cost of deposits and θ(Di) > 0 is marginal cost of loans. We
assume that the same technology is avairable to all banks and that C(Li,Di) is continuously
diﬀerentiable up to any order. Note that the sign of the cross derivative of this cost function
∂C/∂Li∂Di depends on the sign of θ
0(Di). The economic interpretation of the condition of
∂C/∂Li∂Di is related to the notion of scope economies. When ∂C/∂Li∂Di < 0 (θ
0(·) < 0),
there exists economies of scope. This implies that a guniversalh bank that jointly oﬀers
6In what follows, unless otherwise noted, subscripts i,j = A,B and i 6= j.
3loans and deposits is more eﬃcient than two seperate entities, specialized respectively
on loans and deposits. On the contrary, when ∂C/∂Li∂Di > 0 (θ
0(·) > 0), there exists
diseconomies of scope. Finally, there exists no scope economies when ∂C/∂Li∂Di = 0
(θ
0(·) = 0)7.
In what follows, we focus on the case where θ
00(·) = 0, and rL(L) , rD(D) are linear
fuction such as rL = a − bL, rD = β + γD, where a,b,β,γ > 0.
Now, under these speciﬁcation, the equation (1) can be rewritten as
πi(Li,Di) = [a − b(Li + Lj) − r − θ(Di)]Li + [r(1 − α) − β − γ(Di + Dj) − φ]Di. (4)
The timing of the game is as follows: In the ﬁrst stage, each bank simultaneously
chooses the volume of deposits. Then they simultaneously choose the volume of loans in
the second stage. Therefore, each bank engages in sequential portfolio choice problem. We
assume that there is a well-deﬁned Nash equilibrium in the second stage competition. In
what follows, we adopt the subgame-perfect equilibrium as equilibrium concept. Thus, we
can solve the game by backward induction.
We start to analyze the second stage competition among banks. Each bank chooses Li
to maximize πi in (4). The ﬁrst-order conditions are
∂πA
∂LA




= a − 2bLB − bLA − r − θ(DB) = 0. (6)
The second-order conditions are also satisﬁed. Combining (5) and (6) yields the equilibrium
amounts of loans in the second-stage subgame as
LA =










(·) > 0 (resp. θ
0
(·) < 0) is not the deﬁnition but the suﬃcient condition for economies of
scope (resp. deseconomies of scope). See Baumol et al. (1982).
4From (7) and (8), One can easily conﬁrm the strategic eﬀects of the deposits, Di and
























Note that strategic eﬀects of Di, Dj depend on the sign of θ
0(·). In the case of economies
of scope (θ
0(·) < 0), ∂Li/∂Di > 0, ∂Li/∂Dj < 0. On the other hand, ∂Li/∂Di < 0,
∂Li/∂Dj > 0 in the case of diseconomies of scope (θ
0(·) > 0).
Now turning to consider the ﬁrst stage. By substituting (7) and (8) into (4), we obtain








+[r(1 − α) − β − γ(Di + Dj) − φ]Di. (11)
Where i,j = A,B,i 6= j. By diﬀerentiating (11) with respect to Di and setting this ﬁrst






















(DB)−2γDB−γDA+r(1−α)−β−φ = 0. (13)




9b − 2γ < 0 for ∀i, i = A,B.
The equation (12) (resp.13) gives the best-response function of bank A (resp. bank
B) in the deposits: BRA(DB) (resp. BRB(DA)). One can conﬁrm that these reaction
functions are downward sloping as usual in the model of Cournot competition (i.e. strategic
substitutes in Bulow-Geanakoplos-Klemperer (1985) terms). In what follows, We impose





j(Di)| < 1 for i = A,B, i 6= j.
8See Martin (1993).
5Under the Assumption1, Combining (12) and (13) yields the following (ﬁrst-stage)
equilibrium amounts of deposits for each bank, D∗





i(r,α), i = A,B. (14)
By substituting (14) into (7), (8), we can obtain subgame-perfect equilibrium amounts










j(r,α)), i,j = A,B,i 6= j. (15)
3 Comparative Statics
In this section, we investgate the eﬀects of changing the interbank interest rate on the
equilibrium quantities and the corresponding interest rates. We focus on a symmetric
subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Totally diﬀerentiating (12) and (13) with respect to endogenous variables and exogenous






































































The sign of ∆ is positive under the assumption1.









































9Where subscript s means a symmetric equilibrium.
6Under the Assumption 1, we can conﬁrm that {12[θ
0(Ds)]2 − 9bγ}/9b < 010.
Thus, the sign of ∂D∗
s/∂r accords with the sign of [9b(1−α)+4θ
0(Ds)]. The ﬁrst term
in this bracket captures the beneﬁt from the increased marginal revenue from a diﬀerent
increase in the interbank rate, which is always positive. The second term reﬂects the
eﬀect through the scope economies, which is positive (resp. negative) if θ
0(·) > 0 (resp.
θ
0(·) < 0). If θ
0(·) ≥ 0, the sign of [9b(1−α)+4θ
0(Ds)] is always positive. Thus each bank
increases the volumes of deposits. Freixas and Rochet (1997) considers the case where
θ
0(·) = 0. In this simple case, the sign of ∂D∗
s/∂r is always positive. Thus, a rise in r
always increases the volumes of deposits and corresponding interest rate. In the case of
θ
0(·) < 0, however, the sign of [9b(1 − α) + 4θ
0(Ds)] is complicated and it depends on the
range of underlying parameters. Denote the deposit rate in a subgame-perfect equilibrium
by r∗
D = r∗
D(D∗) with derivative r
0
D(·) > 0. The results are summarized as follows.
Proposition 1 The eﬀect of r on r∗
D depends on the scope economies. (i) If θ
0(·) ≥ 0,
then ∂r∗
D/∂r > 0. (ii) If θ
0(·) < 0 and |θ
0(·)| < [9b(1 − α)]/4, then ∂r∗
D/∂r > 0. (iii) If
θ
0(·) < 0 and |θ
0(·)| > [9b(1 − α)]/4, then ∂r∗
D/∂r < 0.
The economics interpretation behind proposition 1 is as follows. In the case where
(i) and (ii) (resp. (iii)), a rise in r gives rise to an outward (resp. inward) shift of each
bank’s reaction curve in deposits respectively. It then follows that each bank increases
(resp. decreases) the volumes of deposits and corresponding interest rate.
From the equation (15), the eﬀect of r on L∗

















































0(Di)]2−18bγ for i = A,B, i 6= j. The nu-
merator is positive due to same technologies among banks. On the other hand, the denominator is negative
from the second order condition. Therefore, |BR
0









9b < 0 for
i = A,B, i 6= j. In a symmetric equilibrium (Ds = Di = Dj), this implies that {12[θ
0
(Ds)]2 − 9bγ} < 0.
7The last equality follows from (9) and (10). For a symmetric case ,Ds = Di = Dj, by using























The ﬁrst term in the right-hand sides of (20) reﬂects the direct eﬀect of an increases in r.
This direct eﬀect is always negative because a rise of interbank rate means a rise of the
opportunity cost of loans. On the other hand, there also exists the indirect eﬀect (strategic
eﬀect) from a change in deposits. Recall that this strategic eﬀect depend on the sign of θ
0(·).
Freixas and Rochet (1997) considers the case where each bank determines the volumes of
deposits and loans simultaneously and scope economies does not exist (θ
0(·) = 0). In this
simple case, strategic eﬀect is not present in (20) and the sign of ∂L∗
s/∂r depends on only
direct eﬀect. Thus, a rise in r always decreases the volumes of loans and increases the
corresponding interest rate. As in the present paper, however, if each bank determines
the volumes of deposits and loans sequentially and scope economies do exist, the sign
of ∂L∗
s/∂r depends on both direct eﬀect and strategic eﬀect. Denote the loan rate in a
subgame-perfect equilibrium by r∗
L = r∗
L(L∗) with derivative r
0
L(·) < 0. The results are
summarized as follows.
Proposition 2 The eﬀect of r on r∗
L depends on the scope economies. (i) If θ
0(·) ≥ 0,
then ∂r∗
L/∂r > 0. (ii) If θ
0(·) < 0 and |θ
0(·)| > [9b(1 − α)]/4, then ∂r∗
L/∂r > 0. (iii) If
θ
0(·) < 0 and |θ
0(·)| < [9b(1 − α)]/4, then the sign of the ∂r∗
L/∂r is indeterminate.
The economics interpretation behind proposition 2 is as follows. In the case of (i) and
(ii), both the direct eﬀect and the indirect eﬀect in (20) work in the same direction. Thus,
a rise in r decreases the volumes of loans and increases the corresponding interest rate.
In the case (iii), however, these two eﬀects work in the opposite direction. We cannot
determine whether the direct eﬀect or the indirect eﬀect dominates the other.


















Table 1: The eﬀects of a change in r on rD and rL
4 Concluding Remarks
Freixas and Rochet (1997) considers simultaneous portfolio choice and the linear cost func-
tion between deposits and loans (i.e. θ
0(·)). They show that an increase in the interbank
interest rate leads to an increase in the interest rates on deposits and loans11.
The present paper describes a two-player, two-stage game. Our model follows the
previous literature with two exceptions. First, the deposit and loan decisions are made
sequentially, rather than simultaneously. Second, we specify a nonlinear cost function,
which allows for economies of scope between deposits and loans.
We show that economies of scope can overturn the ﬁndings of previous studies. Espe-
cially, we show that in the case where large economies of scope an increase in the interbank
interest rate leads to an decrease in the interest rate on deposits and to an increase in the
interest rate on loans.
We note that our results have been obtained in a speciﬁc functional forms with linear
demand function and the supply function. Notwithstanding those speciﬁcations, however,
we believe that our results obatained in this paper are fundamentally robust for a more
general functional forms. The question of how robust they really are will be left for further
research.
11Early work by Klein (1971) and Monti (1972) show that similar results hold in a monopolistic bank
model.
9Appendix
In this appendix, we investgate the eﬀects of changing the reserve rate on the equilibrium
quantities and interest rates.


















































Therefore, in a (symmetric) subgame-perfect equilibrium, an increase of reserve ratio
decreases the amounts of deposits for each bank: dD∗
s/dα = dD∗
i/dα = dD∗
j/dα < 0 ,





D(·) > 0. The results are summarized as follows;
Proposition 3 In a symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium, an increase of reserve ratio
always decreases interest rate on the deposit. That is, ∂r∗
D/∂α < 0.





































The last equality comes from (9) and (10). For a symmetric case (Ds = Di = Dj), by




















10From the Proposition 1, the sign of ∂D∗
s/∂α is negative, so the sign of ∂L∗
s/∂α depends
on the sign of θ
0(·). Therefore, if there exists economies of scope (resp. diseconomies of
scope), then ∂L∗
s/∂α < 0 (resp. ∂L∗
s/∂α > 0). Denote the loan rate in a subgame-perfect
equilibrium by r∗
L = r∗
L(L∗) with derivative r
0
L(·) < 0. The results are summarized as
follows.
Proposition 4 The eﬀect of α on r∗
L depends on the scope economies. (i) If there are
economies of scope (θ
0(·) < 0), then ∂r∗
L/∂α > 0. (ii) If there are no economies of scope
(θ
0(·) = 0), then ∂r∗
L/∂α=0. (iii) If there are diseconomies of scope (θ
0(·) > 0), then
∂r∗
L/∂α < 0.





0(·) < 0 – +
θ
0(·) = 0 – 0
θ
0(·) > 0 – –
Table 2: The eﬀects of a change in α on rD and rL
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